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REAL PROPERTY-TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES-ESTATE CREATED BY
PARoL GIFT FOLLOWED BY A VoLUNTARY SETTLEMENT-Prior to his death
in 1892, X made a parol gift of 60 acres in a 360 acre tract to his daughter,
W, or to W and her husband, H,1 and put them into actual possession but gave
them no deed to the land. No evidence was shown to indicate that either W
or H had paid the taxes or made any improvements on the land during X's
lifetime. X died intestate and left surviving him five children, including W. All
the heirs, except W, conveyed the 60 acre tract to T,V and H in consideration of
a deed releasing all claims that W and H had in the remaining 300 acres. W
died intestate in 1917, and in 1939 H executed a deed to defendants conveying
a one-fourth royalty interest in the minerals in the 60 acre tract. Plaintiffs, the
surviving children of W and H, brought this action in chancery, in 1943, to
determine their rigb.t to said lands and royalties. Held, for the defendants, one
judge dissenting. 2 The parol gift followed by the exchange of deeds constituted
a voluntary settlement which created a tenancy by entireties in W and H, so
that upon W's death, H obtained full title by right of survivorship and therefore was able to convey the royalty interest to defendants. Rowland v. McA. lester Fuel Co., (Ark. 1947) 201 S. W •. (2d) 742.
The general rule is that a parol gift of land is invalid and ineffective to
pass title to the donee; and this is true even where the gift is accompanied by
possession.8 Upon the intestate death of the donor, the several heirs inherit as
tenants in common, in proportion to their respective shares or rights.4 When the
.wife is a tenant in common, and there is a voluntary partition 5 of the common
estate, a deed made to the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties, conveys
no estate to the husband, but vests the entire estate in the wife, even though the
1 Principal case at 742. Th~ report of the case does not, clearly indicate whether
the parol gift was made to joint donees.
2 Dissenting opinion, (Ark. 1947) 202 S.W. (2d) 204.
8 38 C.J.S., Gifts, p. 843.
,
Of course, if the donee makes valuable improvements the gift will be enforced when revocation would be inequitable. See Pound,
"Consideration in Equity," 13 ILL. L. REv. 667 at 672 (1919); POMEROY, SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF CoNTRACTS, 3d ed., 332 (1926); Floyd v. Floyd, 97 Ga. 124, 24
S.E. 451 (1895).
4 Ark. Stat. (Po'pe, 1937) c. 47, § 435~.
G "Partition ••• is voluntary when it is made among all the co-heirs present and of
age, and by their mutual consent." BLACK, LAW D1cTIONARY, 3d ed., 1330 (1933).
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wife directed the deed to be made to her husband and herself jointly.6 The deed
confers no new title or additional estate in the land, but merely destroys the
unity of possession among the tenants in common, and henceforth each holds
his share in severalty. Despite these considerations, the court here reasons that
if the deed had been made to the wife alone and had she conveyed to a third party
who then conveyed back to her and her husband jointly, there could be no
question that they would have held by the entireties. Instead of doing that, she
had the deed made to them both, and this fact, coupled with the parol gift,
took the transaction out of the rule of the voluntary partition cases, and thereby
constituted a voluntary settlement. 7 Considering the obvious intent of the parties
to the deeds made after the death of X, together with long continued possession
by the husband and his payment of taxes under color of title for many years,
one may feel a considerable measure of sympathy for the court's result. Yet
any justification for the court's decision on the basis of an equitable settlement
seems dubious. The express language of the deed of release 8 from the husband
and wife is strong evidence indicating a belief that they took the 60 acres as
her share of her father's estate by mutual consent of the other heirs. Since the
parol gift is ineffective to create any title and since the wife takes by virtue of
her right as one of the heirs, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that,
despite the efforts of the parties to carry out the intention of their father, all
that was really accompli~hed was a voluntary partition of the estate, giving the
sister her proportionate share of the land, and creating no new title in her
husband.
Ralph J. Isackson

6 McGraw v. Berry, 152 Ark. 452, 238 S. W. 618 (1922); Wood v. Wilder,
222 N.C. 622, 24 S. E. (2d) 474 (1942).
1 As authority for the proposition that the transaction created a voluntary settlement, the court cite~ Evans v. Wells, 138 Ark. 454, 212 S.W. 328 (1919) and
Hannaford v. Dowdle, 75 Ark. 127,, 86 S.W. 818 (1905). In the former case, the
deceased deposited money in the bank in the names of herself and her husband jointly.
The husband withdrew the funds with his wife's knowledge and before her death,
later purchasing lands therewith. Deceased's collateral heirs sought to have a trust
declared upon the land in their favor. Held, the deceased had made a valid gift of
the money to her husband during her lifetime. In the Hannaford case, the wife
deeded her land to a creditor of her husband. The next day, in accordance with the
wife's wishes, the creditor deeded the land back to the husband subject to a vendor's
lien for the amount of the debt. Heirs of wife brought action to have the deeds
declared mortgages, subject to redemption. Held, the wife intended the title to vest
in her husband, and he took title subject to the vendor's lien.
8 Dissenting opinion, (Ark. 1947) 202 S.W. (2d) 204. "Witnesseth that said
parties of the first part, for, and in consideration of the_sum of 60 acres of land as their
part of said estate by said parties of the second part."

